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UTAH 
Re: Wendell E. Brumlev v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 91-0242 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
I am writing pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to advise 
the Court of some recent authority that has come to the attention of counsel while awaiting 
the Court's decision on the Defendants/Appellants' Petition for Rehearing. 
Point IV A of the Defendant's Petition for Rehearing (p. 4) and Point I of the Brief of 
Amicus Curiae argue that Utah law provides adequate pre-deprivation procedures consistent 
with the requirements of federal due process. The State would like to add the following 
cases recently decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in support of that argument: 
Reich v. Collins. No. S92A0621, S92A0622 (Georgia, Dec. 2, 1993) 
lames B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia. No. S93A1217, S93A1218 (Georgia, Dec. 
2, 1993) 
Neither of these cases are readily available, so I am enclosing copies of both. To put these 
cases in context, I would refer the Court to the earlier Georgia Supreme Court decision in 
Reich v. Collins, 422 So. E. 2d 846 (1992) (state refund statute does not apply to taxpayer 
who paid income taxes under statute subsequently declared to be unconstitutional) (copy 
enclosed). 
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Finally, Point IV C of Defendants/Appellants original brief in this matter argued that 
the Utah statute, if requiring a refund, should not be applied retroactively. This Court's 
recent decisioi 1 if i Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, V>. v^:()J22 «.i iah Dec 6, 1 * * * 
is relevant to this argi iment Tho Stntr will provide a cop\ 01 rips t ^ ' to Plaintiff/Crosv 
Appellants. 
Thank you foi your coi isideratioi i of Uub matter. 
CAROL CLAWSON 
cc: Jack C. Helgesen, Richard W lories w/encl. (by fax and i nail) 
Governor Michael O I ea\ itt w /ei i d 
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REICH 
v. 
COLLINS, et al. 
REICH 
v. 
COLLINS, et al. 
Nos. S92A0621, S92A0622. 
Supreme Court of Georgia. 
Nov. 19, 1992. 
Reconsideration Denied Dec. 17, 1992. 
Taxpayer who paid state income taxes 
on federal military retirement benefits 
sought refund. The Superior Court, Clay-
ton County, Kenneth Kilpatrick, J., denied 
refund, and appeal was taken. The Su-
preme Court, Clarke, C J., held that taxpay-
er who paid state income taxes under stat-
ute subsequently declared to be unconstitu-
tional or otherwise invalid was not entitled 
to refund. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Sears-Collins, J., concurred in judg-
ment only. 
1. Courts ^100(1) 
United States Supreme Court's Davis 
decision, holding that state may not exempt 
state retirement benefits from state income 
taxation while taxing federal retirement 
benefits, was retroactively applicable to 
case of retired military officer whose feder-
al military retirement benefits had been 
taxed by state which exempted benefits 
paid to retired state employees. 
2. Taxation *=»1097 
Taxpayer who paid state income taxes 
under statute subsequently declared to be 
unconstitutional or otherwise invalid was 
not entitled to refund; refund statute was 
applicable only where taxes were errone-
ously or illegally assessed under valid law. 
O.C.G.A. § 48~2-35(a). 
1. This Code section permits the states to tax 
"pay or compensation for personal services as [a 
federal] officer or employee if the taxation 
3. Taxation <*=>1097 
In cases in which taxing statute is 
declared unconstitutional or otherwise void, 
taxpayer must have made demand for re-
fund at time tax is paid or at time his tax 
return is filed, whichever occurs last; fail-
ure to do so bars any future claim. 
Carlton M. Henson, McAlpin & Henson, 
Atlanta, for Reich. 
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., and War-
ren R. Calvert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, 
for Collins. 
CLARKE, Chief Justice. 
We granted the appellant's application to 
appeal, OCGA § 5-6-35(a), to consider the 
issue of his entitlement to a refund of state 
income taxes paid on his federal military 
retirement benefits in view of the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. 
Michigan, 489 U.S. 803, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 
L.Ed.2d 891 (1989). 
Former OCGA § 48-7-27 created an in-
come tax exemption for retirement benefits 
paid by the State of Georgia to retired 
state employees. No such exemption exist-
ed for retirement benefits paid by the fed-
eral government to retired federal employ-
ees residing in Georgia. In Davis v. Michi-
gan, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court held that Michigan's taxing scheme, 
which exempted from state income taxation 
all state retirement benefits, but taxed all 
federal retirement benefits, violated the 
constitutional principles of intergovernmen-
tal tax immunity, as well as 4 U.S.C. 
§ 111.1 Because the State of Michigan 
conceded that a refund would be due the 
taxpayer if the Court found its taxing 
scheme to be unconstitutional, it was not 
necessary for the Court to determine the 
merits of the taxpayer's claim for a refund. 
The case was remanded to the Michigan 
courts to comply with the Court's ''man-
date of equal treatment," Davis, 489 U.S. 
at 818, 109 S.Ct at 1509, in determining 
docs not discriminate against the employee be-
cause of the source of the pay or compensa-
tion." 
REICH v. COLLINS 
Ctte*422 &&2d M6 (Ga. 1992) 
whether the taxpayer was entitled to pro- merce Clause, 
gpective relief from discriminatory taxa-
tion. 
Following the decision in Davis v. Michi-
gan, the Georgia legislature, in special ses-
sion, repealed that portion of OCGA § 48-
7-27 which granted retired state employees 
an exemption from income taxation on their 
retirement benefits. Shortly thereafter, 
appellant, a retired colonel in the United 
States Army, filed a claim with the appellee 
Department of Revenue for a refund of 
income taxes he had paid to the State of 
Georgia on his military retirement benefits. 
The Department denied his claim, and ap-
pellant brought this action pursuant to 
OCGA § 48-2-35. 
The case came before the trial court on 
cross-motions for summary judgment. The 
trial court concluded that former OCGA 
§ 48-7-27 violated the principles of Davis 
v. Michigan, supra, and partially granted 
the appellant's motion for summary judg-
ment on this issue. However, after analyz-
ing the case under Chevron Oil v. Huson, 
404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 
(1971), the trial court held that Davis v. 
Michigan should not be applied retrospec-
tively. The trial court therefore concluded 
that the appellant was not entitled to a 
refund, and granted the appellee's motion 
for summary judgment in this regard. 
The appellant concedes that if this court 
determines that he is entitled to a refund, 
he will be eligible only for the taxable 
years 1985 through 1988. 
1. We agree with the trial court that 
the principles of Davis v. Michigan apply 
to this case.2 However, we have deter-
mined that, with regard to the issue of 
retroactive application, the case must be 
analyzed under James B. Beam v. Georgia, 
501 U.S. , 111 S.Ct 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 
481 (1991), rather than the test set out in 
Chevron Oil, supra. 
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 
U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 LEd.2d 200 
(1984), the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
Hawaii's taxing scheme, which distin-
guished between imported and locally dis-
tilled alcohol products, violated the Com-
Ga. 847 
Following this decision, 
James B. Beam Distilling Company filed a 
suit for refund of taxes it had paid to the 
State of Georgia, claiming entitlement to 
the refund under Bacchus. In James B. 
Beam v. State of Georgia, 259 Ga. 363, 382 
S.E.2d 95 (1989), this court recognized that 
Georgia's taxing scheme, which imposed a 
higher tax on alcoholic beverages imported 
into the state than on alcohol produced in 
this state, violated the principles of Bac-
chus, supra. However, analyzing the case 
under Chevron Oil, supra, we held that the 
trial court did not err in applying the Bac-
chus decision prospectively only. The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to our 
decision in Beam and reversed, holding 
that Bacchus should have been applied ret-
roactively to our decision in Beam. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that where, 
in a civil case such as Bacchus, it does not 
reserve the question of whether the hold-
ing should be applied retroactively, the de-
cision "is properly understood to have fol-
lowed the normal rule of retroactive appli-
cation in a civil case," — U.S. at , 111 
S.Ct. at 2445, 115 L.Ed.2d at 490, and thus 
the decision is to be applied not only to the 
parties before it, but "to all others by and 
against whom claims may be pressed, con-
sistent with res judicata and procedural 
barriers such as statutes of limitation." 
Id — U.S. at , 111 S.Ct at 2443, 115 
L.Ed.2d at 488. The Court held that it is 
error for a lower court to refuse to apply a 
rule of federal law retroactively after the 
case announcing it has already done so. 
Id — U.S. at , 111 S.Ct. at 2446, 115 
L.Ed.2d at 491. The Court went on to 
distinguish between the issue of retroactiv-
ity where a federal law or constitutional 
question is raised, and the issue of reme-
dies, "i.e., whether the party prevailing un-
der a new rule should obtain the same 
relief that would have been awarded if the 
rule had been an old one." Id — U.S. at 
, 111 S.Ct at 2443, 115 L.Ed.2d at 487. 
In the normal circumstance, the issue of 
retrospectivity, or choice of law, is a feder-
al question, while the remedial inquiry is 
left to the states. Id — U.S. at , 111 
2. We note that the State did not appeal this 
422S.E.20-28 
ruling by the trial court. 
848 Ga. 422 SOUTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
S.Ct at 2443, 115 L.Ed.2d at 488. The 
Court stated, as a general guideline, that 
when it remands a case to a lower court for 
consideration of any remedial issues, this 
"necessarily implies" that the choice of 
law, or retroactivity, question has been de-
cided, and that the Court will apply its 
decision not only to the parties before it, 
but retrospectively to all others not proce-
durally barred. Id. — U.S. at , 111 
S.Ct at 2445-46, 115 L.Ed.2d at 490-491.3 
The State's argument in the case before 
us is that because it cannot be determined 
from the Court's opinion in Davis v. Michi-
gan that the case was remanded for consid-
eration of remedial issues since Michigan 
had conceded that a refund was due the 
taxpayer, it cannot be concluded that the 
Supreme Court intended retroactive appli-
cation of the Davis decision. We do not 
agree. 
[1] As we read Davis v. Michigan, the 
Court applied its decision to the taxpayer 
before it. The State of Michigan conceded 
that if the Court found its taxing scheme to 
be unconstitutional, then, under state law, 
the taxpayer would be entitled to a refund. 
Once the Supreme Court determined that 
Michigan's taxing scheme was unconstitu-
tional and applied that principle to the tax-
payer, Michigan conceded that the taxpayer 
was entitled to a refund. It does not fol-
low that if the Supreme Court had deter-
mined that its decision in Davis was to be 
3. The Court held in Beam that principles of 
"equality and stare decisis" prevail over the 
Chevron Oil analysis, Beam, — VS. at , 111 
S.Ct. at 2446, 115 L.Ed.2d at 491, and that the 
need to ensure that the substantive law "will not 
shift and spring/* la\ — VS. at , 111 S.Ct. 
at 2447, 115 L.Ed.2d at 493, limits the "possible 
applications of Chevron OiL" Id 
4. See Beam, — VS. at , 111 S.Ct at 2443, 
115 L.Ed.2d at 488 for a discussion of prospec-
tive application of court decisions. Under the 
Court's analysis, the prospective method of over-
ruling cases does not apply the new rule to the 
parties in the case, but only uses the case as a 
vehicle for announcing a new rule of law. The 
principle of selective prospectivity, in which the 
new rule is applied to the litigants before the 
court, has been abandoned in the criminal con-
text, see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 
S.Ct 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), and "appears 
never to have been endorsed [by the Court] in 
prospective only,4 and thus not applicable 
to the litigants before it, that the State of 
Michigan would have conceded the taxpay-
er was due a refund. 
Further, the issue of whether Davis v. 
Michigan is to be applied retroactively is 
foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision 
in Barker v. Kansas, — U.S. , 112 
S.Ct 1619, 118 L.Ed.2d 243 (1992). In that 
case military retirees challenged the Kan-
sas income taxation scheme which permit-
ted taxation of federal retirement benefits 
while exempting from taxation state retire-
ment benefits. The U.S. Supreme Court 
held that this case was controlled by Davis 
v. Michigan. The Court reversed and re-
manded to the lower court for a determina-
tion of the remaining issues, including the 
taxpayers' entitlement to refunds of taxes 
previously paid. As such, it is clear that 
the Court applied the decision of Davis v. 
Michigan retroactively to the litigants in 
Barker, just as the Court applied the Bac-
chus decision retroactively to the litigants 
in James Beam} 
We thus conclude that the trial court 
correctly held that OCGA § 48-7-27 violat-
ed the principles of Davis v. Michigan, but 
erred in holding that this case does not 
apply retroactively. 
2. The issue of what remedy is to be 
afforded the appellant remains. This is a 
question of state law. Beam, supra, — 
U.S. at , 111 S.Ct at 2443, 115 L.Ed.2d 
the civil context." Beam, — VS. at , 111 
S.Ct. at , 115 L.Ed.2d at 490. 
5. We further note that the Virginia Supreme 
Court analyzed an identical tax issue under the 
principles of Chevron Oil, and determined that 
Davis v. Michigan is not to be applied retroac-
tively. Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 241 
Va. 232, 401 S.E.2d 868 (1991). The US. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari as to this deci-
sion, vacated the judgment of the Virginia Su-
preme Court, and remanded for consideration 
in light of its decision in James Beam. — VS. 
, 111 S.Ct. 2883, 115 LEd.2d 1049 (1991). 
On remand the Virginia Supreme Court con-
cluded that James Beam does not require retro-
active application of Davis v. Michigan, 242 Va. 
322, 410 S.E.2d 629 (1991). On May 18, 1992, 
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
that decision. — VS. , 112 S.Ct 1934,118 
L.Ed.2d 541. 
CRUZ-PADILLO v. STATE 
CHCM422 8 £ J d M9 (Gft. 1992) 
Ga. 849 
at 488. As the Supreme Court stated in 
Beam, nothing deprives the State of its 
"opportunity to raise procedural bars to 
recovery under state law or demonstrate 
reliance interests entitled to consideration 
in determining the nature of the remedy 
that must be provided " Beam, — 
VS. at , 111 S.Ct at 2448,115 L.Ed.2d 
at 494. 
[2] OCGA § 48-2-35(a) provides, in 
part, that "[a] taxpayer shall be refunded 
any and all taxes or fees which are deter-
mined to have been erroneously or illegally 
assessed and collected from him under the 
laws of this state, whether paid voluntarily 
or involuntarily ..." (Emphasis supplied.) 
We hold that this statute contemplates the 
situation where a taxing authority errone-
ously or illegally assesses and collects a 
tax under a valid law. It does not address 
the situation where the law under which 
the taxes are assessed and collected is it-
self subsequently declared to be unconsti-
tutional or otherwise invalid. This di&tinc-
tion is significant in that the State must be 
\ able to rely on the laws under which it 
assesses taxes in order to promote stable 
and efficient government. Furthermore, 
this protects the State against those in-
stances in which a vendor/taxpayer has 
recouped its tax expense by passing it on to 
the consumer. See, e.g., Atlanta Ameri-
cana Motor Hotel Corp. v. Vndercofler, 
222 Ga. 295(1), 149 S.E.2d 691 (1966); 
Blackmon v. Premium Oil Stations, Inc., 
129 Ga-App. 169, 198 S.E.2d 900 (1973); 
Blackmon v. Ga Independent Oilmen's 
Ass'n, 129 Ga.App. 171, 198 S.E.2d 896 
(1973). Were we to interpret the statute 
differently, the vendor/taxpayer would re-
alize a windfall or double recovery not in-
tended by the legislature. 
Thus we conclude that the taxpayer is 
not entitled to a refund under the provi-
sions of OCGA § 48-2-35(a). 
[3] We take this opportunity to hold 
that in cases in which a taxing statute is 
declared unconstitutional or otherwise void, 
riT taxpayer must have made a demand for 
' refund at the time the tax is paid or at the 
time his tax return is filed, whichever oc-
curs last Failure to do so bars any future 
claim. 
Judgment affirmed in part and re-
versed in part 
HUNT, BENHAM and FLETCHER, JJ., 
concur. 
SEARS-COLLINS, J., concurs in the 
judgment only. 
BELL, PJ., disqualified. 
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CRUZ-PADILLO 
v. 
The STATE. 
No. S92A0629. 
Supreme Court of Georgia. 
Nov. 19, 1992. 
Reconsideration Denied Dec. 17, 1992. 
Defendant was convicted in the Superi-
or Court, Clayton County, William H. Ison, 
J., of felony-murder, voluntary manslaugh-
ter, aggravated assault, and possession of 
a firearm during commission of a felony. 
Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Bell, P J., held that (1) evidence sustained 
conviction for felony-murder; (2) defendant 
was barred from asserting that court 
should have sentenced him for felony man-
slaughter instead of felony-murder because 
of his failure to object; (3) trial court's 
violation of defendant's rights to remain 
silent and to due process was harmless 
error; and (4) any error in trial court's 
ruling that defendant could not introduce 
evidence of victim's reputation for violence 
was not subject to reversal because defen-
dant made no offer of proof. 
Affirmed. 
1. Homicide *»235 
Evidence sustained conviction for 
felony-murder; defendant motioned for vie-
MICHAEL J, BOWERS 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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In the Supreme Court of Georgia 
Decided: DEC 2 1993 
S92A0621. REICH v, COLLINS, et al. 
SS2A0622. REICH v. COLLINS, et al. 
CLARKE, Chief Justice. 
In Reich v. Collins, 2S2 Ga. 625 (422 SE2d 846) (1992) (Reich 
v. Collins I), we were faced with the issue of whether appellant 
Reich was entitled to a refund of state income taxes paid on his 
federal military retirement benefits in view of the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (103 
SC 1500, 103 LE2d 891) (1989). The latter case held that a state 
taxing scheme which exempts state retirement benefits from state 
income taxation but does not, so exempt federal retirement benefits 
violates the United States Constitution.1 The initial issue to be 
determined in Reich v. Collins I was whether Davis v. Michigan 
should be applied retrospectively to Reich's claim. We held that, 
under recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 
retrospective application was required, but ultimately concluded 
that state law barred Reich's claim to a refund under OCGA 48-2-35 
(a). 
1
 Former OCGA 48-7-27 created a state income taxing scheme, 
a portion of which was unconstitutional under the" authority of 
Davis v. Michigan. After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Davis, the 
Georgia legislature repealed the unconstitutional provisions of the 
code section. 
1 
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted Reich's petition 
for certiorari. That Court vacated the judgment in Reich v. 
Collins I, and remanded the case to us f,for further consideration 
in light of Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation," 509 U.S. 
(113 SC 2510, 509 LE2d _ _ ) (1993). 
In Harper, the United States Supreme Court reversed a decision 
of the Virginia Supreme Court which held that the appellants in 
that case were not entitled to refunds of state income taxes 
because Davis v. Michigan should be applied prospectively only. 
The U.S. Supreme Court initially determined that Davis v. Michigan 
applies retrospectively. It then remanded Harper to the Virginia 
Supreme Court to follow the Constitutional mandate of providing 
relief "consistent with federal due process principles . ,T Harper, 
113 SC at 2519. 
Due process requires that a state provide procedural 
safeguards against the unlawful exactions of taxes, McKesson Core. 
v. Division of Alcoholic Veberages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (110 SC 
2238, 2250, 100 LE2d 148} (1990), but the state retains some 
flexibility in the type safeguards it must provide. Harper, supra, 
113 SC at 2519; James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. The State of 
Georgia, S93A1217, (Decided December
 r 1993). In remanding 
Harper, the United States Supreme Court held that 
If Virginia 'offers a meaningful opportunity for 
taxpayers to withold contested tax assessments and to 
challenge their validity in a predeprivation hearing,' 
the 'availability of a predeprivation hearing constitutes 
a procedural safeguard...sufficient by itself to satisfy 
the Due Process Clause.' [citing McKesson Corp v. 
Division of Alcoholic Beverages L Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18; 
38, n. 21]•,.. On the other hand, if no such 
2 
predeprivation remedy exists, 'the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide 
meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any 
unconstitutional deprivation.' 113 SC at 2519.2 
In the first division of Reich v. Collins I, we held, 
consistent with Harper v. Virginia, that Davis v. Michigan must be 
applied retrospectively. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has 
vacated our judgment in that case, we expressly incorporate 
Division One of Reich v. Collins I into this opinion. We therefore 
conclude that our duty on remand is to determine whether Georgia 
law provided a predeprivation remedy to Reich sufficient to satisfy 
the requirements of federal due process as set out in Harper and 
McKesson, supra. While the selection of a remedy to be afforded is 
an issue of state law, James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 
U.S. (111 SC 2439, 115 LE2d 481, 488] (1991), this remedy must 
satisfy "minimum federal requirements." Harper, supra, 113 SC at 
2520. 
We have recently held in James 5, Beam Distilling Co. v. The 
State of Georcria, 393A1217, supra, that the declaratory judgment 
remedies under OCGA 9-4-1 et seq., as well as statutory injunctive 
relief remedies available provide meaningful opportunities to 
taxpayers to litigate the validity of taxes alleged owing prior to 
the time when the taxes fall due-3 As such, these remedies are of 
2
 In McKesson the Court suggested that "meaningful, 
backward-looking relief" could include a refund, Id. at 2251, or 
the assessment and collection, of back taxes from those who received 
favored treatment in violation of the Constitution, ££. at 2252, 
3
 In McKessson, supra, 110 SC at 2250, the Court held that 
"[t]he State may choose to provide a form of 'predeprivation 
process,' for example by authorizing taxpayers to bring suit to 
3 
themselves sufficient to satisfy federal due process requirements.4 
Additionally, there are predeprivation remedies under the 
Georgia Administrative Procedure Act of which a taxpayer may avail 
himself when making a constitutional challenge to a state tax. 
Under OCGA 50-13-12, a taxpayer who is aggrieved by "any act,r of 
the Department of Revenue "in a matter involving..•.liability for 
taxes," is entitled to a hearing before the Department, OCGA 50-
13-19 and OCGA 5-13-20 provide for judicial review to a taxpayer 
dissatisfied with a decision by the Department of Revenue in a case 
brought under OCGA 50-13-12. 
Further, pursuant to OCGA 48-2-59, a taxpayer may appeal an 
assessment by the Department of Revenue directly to the superior 
court, without the necessity of an administrative hearing-
We conclude that there are ample predeprivation remedies under 
Georgia law available to a taxpayer who seeks to challenge an 
allegedly unconstitutional tax. These remedies satisfy the 
requirements of federal due process as set forth in McKesson and 
Harper, supra. Consequently, Reich's due process rights have not 
been violated by the Department's failure to refund to him that 
portion of income taxes paid in violation of Davis v. Michigan. 
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the 
Justices concur except Sears-Collins and Carlev, JJ., who dissent. 
enjoin imposition of a tax prior to its payment... " 
4
 Reach maintains that these are not viable remedies because 
his lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the tax at issue in 
this case was unconstitutional was dismissed by the superior court-
However, Reich did not appeal that decision. 
4 
S93A0621# S93A0622. REICH v* COLLINS et al. 
CARLEYf Justice, dissenting* 
Former OCGA § 48-7-27 provided that state retirement benefits 
were exempt from income taxation by the State, but that federal 
retirement benefits were not. However# the unconstitutionality of 
this former provision was established by the holding in Davis v. 
Michigan. 489 U.S. 803 (109 SC 1500, 103 LE2d 891) (1989). The 
mandate of Davis is to be applied retroactively, rather than 
prospectively. Harper v. Va. Deot. of Taxation. 509 U.S* __ (113 
SC 2510, 125 LE2d 74) (1993). Appellant is a Georgia taxpayer who 
seeks a refund of income taxes that he previously paid to the State 
pursuant to the unconstitutional provisions of former OCGA § 48-7-
27. There is no question of appellant's standing to seek such a 
refund. Compare James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. State of Ga-, 
Ga. (Case Number S93A1217, decided December , 1993). However, 
the majority nevertheless holds that appellant is not entitled to 
seek a refund because federal due process has otherwise been 
satisfied. In my opinion, appellant is entitled to the refund that 
he seeks and I must, therefore, dissent. 
Where, as here, a taxpayer seeks a refund of state taxes that 
he has paid pursuant to a statute which is in contravention of the 
federal constitution, M[s]tate lav may provide relief beyond the 
demands of federal due process, [cit.], but under no circumstances 
may it confine [the taxpayer] to a lesser remedy, [cit.]," Harper 
v, Va« Deot- of Taxation, supra at (III) • The minimum 
parameters of federal due process are clear. If a state has 
offered w%a meaningful opportunity for taxpayers to withhold 
contested tax assessments and to challenge their validity in a 
predeprivation hearing,* the *availability of a predeprivation 
hearing constitutes a procedural safeguard •. • sufficient by itself 
to satisfy the Due Process Clause-' [Cit.] On the other hand, if 
no such predeprivation remedy exists, %the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the state to provide meaningful 
backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional 
deprivation.' [Cit.] In providing such relief, a State may either 
award full refunds to those burdened by the unlawful tax or issue 
some other order that %create(s) in hindsight a nondiscriminatory 
scheme.' [Cit.]" Harper v. Va- Dent- of Taxation, supra at 
(III)- in responding to the unconstitutionality of former OCGA § 
48-7-27, Georgia did not create "in hindsight a nondiscriminatory 
scheme* by assessing and collecting back income taxes from those 
taxpayers whose state retirement benefits had previously been 
exempted from taxation* See McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic 
Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 40 (III) (B) (110 SC 2238, 100 
LE2d 148) (1990)• Georgia merely repealed the unconstitutional 
provisions of that former statute. Accordingly, appellant is 
constitutionally entitled to a refund unless he had available to 
him at the time that he paid the taxes a meaningful opportunity to 
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withhold their payment and to challenge their validity in a 
predeprivation hearing. H[I]f a State chooses not to secure 
payments under duress and instead offers a meaningful opportunity 
for taxpayers to withhold contested tax assessments and to 
challenge their validity in a predeprivation hearing, payments 
tendered may be deemed %voluntary.' . •. * (W)here voluntary payment 
(of a tax) is Knowingly made pursuant to an illegal demand, 
recovery of that payment may be denied.'" McKesson v. Div. of 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, supra at 38 (III) (B), fn. 21. 
The issue for resolution isr therefore, whether appellant paid the 
unconstitutional taxes "voluntarily" or under "duress." 
In my opinion, nothing under the specific provisions of the 
state tax code can be said to have provided appellant with the 
opportunity for a constitutionally meaningful predeprivation 
challenge to his payment of taxes pursuant to the unconstitutional 
provisions of former OCGA § 46-7-27, The majority cites OCGA § 48-
2-59 as affording appellant such an opportunity. Subsection (a) of 
that statute does provide generally for an "appeal from any order, 
ruling, or finding of the commissioner to the superior court.,.." 
However, subsection (c) further provides that, in order to secure 
review by the superior court, the taxpayer must file a surety bond 
or other security "conditioned to pay any tax over and above that 
for which the taxpayer has admitted liability and which is found to 
be due by a final judgment of the court, together with interest and 
costs." By conditioning the taxpayer's right to appeal upon the 
posting of "a surety bond or other security," OCGA § 48-2-59 does 
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not, in my opinion, satisfy '""the root requirement" of the Due 
Process Clause . . • ,fthat an individual be given an opportunity for 
a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property 
interest,"' [cit.].*.." (Emphasis in original-) McKesson v. Div* 
of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, supra at 37 (III) (B) . To the 
contrary, that statute is merely one of the "various sanctions and 
summary remedies [contained in the tax code which are] designed so 
that [taxpayers] tender tax payments before their obligations are 
entertained and resolved." (Emphasis in original.) McKesson v. 
Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, supra at 38 (III) (B). 
Thus, I cannot agree with the majority that OCGA § 48-2-59 
satisfies minimum federal due process requirements such that 
appellant's failure to have resorted thereto renders his payment of 
the unconstitutional state income taxes "voluntary" and non-
refundable. WA state that %establish(es) various sanctions and 
summary remedies designed' to prompt taxpayers to 1tender . •. 
payments before their objections are entertained or resolved' does 
not provide taxpayers xa meaningful opportunity to withhold payment 
and to obtain a predeprivation determination of the tax 
assessment's validity.' [Cit*] such limitations impose 
constitutionally significant *"duress*" because a tax payment 
rendered under these circumstances must be treated as an effort *to 
avoid financial sanctions or a seizure of real or personal 
property*' [Cit.] The State accordingly may not confine a 
taxpayer under duress to prospective relief." (Emphasis in 
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original.) Harper v. Va. Deot« of Taxation, supra at (III), fn. 
10. 
The majority also finds that the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) afforded appellant a constitutionally meaningful 
predeprivation remedy for contesting his payment of the 
unconstitutional taxes. Subsection (a) of OCGA § 50-13-12 does 
provide that the ••Department of Revenue shall hold a hearing upon 
written demand therefor by any taxpayer aggrieved by any act of the 
department in a matter involving his liability for taxes....* 
However, appellant was not "aggrieved by any act of the 
department,w but by an allegedly unconstitutional act of the 
legislature* Even assuming that the department would have had 
initial jurisdiction under the APA to entertain a challenge to the 
constitutionality of former OCGA § 48-7-27, such a challenge would 
be "futile at the time of its making.11 Flint River Mills v. Henry, 
234 Ga« 385, 386 (216 SE2d 895) (1975). Thus, to secure a ruling 
on the constitutionality of former OCGA § 48-7-27 pursuant to the 
APA, appellant would presumably have been required to undergo an 
entirely "futile" hearing before the department and then incur the 
additional expenditure of time and money pursuing an appeal to the 
superior court. The availability of such an attenuated process 
cannot, in my opinion, be deemed to have provided appellant "with 
all of the [predeprivation] process [he] is due: an opportunity to 
contest the validity of the tax and a %clear and certain remedy' 
designed to render the opportunity meaningful by preventing any *. -
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[pre]deprivation of property.M McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic 
Beverages and Tobacco, supra at 40 (III) (B)„ 
Moreover, nothing in OCGA § 50-13-12 authorizes the taxpayer 
to withhold his taxes pending resolution of his purported 
administrative remedy and compels the department to forego the 
various sanctions and summary remedies that it is otherwise 
authorized to employ against the taxpayer under the tax code. 
Subsection (c) of that statute merely provides that, pending the 
hearing and decision, the department "pay suspend or postpone the 
effective date of its previous action." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Thus, "[a] taxpayer who chooses [the administrative] remedy • *. is 
subject to the discretion of the commissioner and/or reviewing 
court as to whether collection procedures will be stayed ([cit.]) ." 
Gainsville-Hall county Economic Opportunity Org.
 f Inc. v. Blackmon. 
233 Ga. 507, 508 (I) (212 SE2d 341) (1975). Since the 
administrative remedy relied upon by the majority does not clearly 
protect the taxpayer against the department's employment of its 
various sanctions and summary remedies designed to encourage timely 
payment prior to resolution of the dispute, I cannot agree with the 
majority's conclusion that that remedy satisfies the minimum 
requirements of federal due process. "We have long held that, when 
a tax is paid in order to avoid financial sanctions or a seizure of 
real or personal property, the tax is paid under *duress' in the 
sense that the state has not provided a fair and meaningful 
predeprivation procedure. [Cits•]" McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic 
Beverages and Tobacco, supra at 38 (III) (B) , fn. 21. 
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The majority also relies upon the Declaratory Judgment Act as 
affording appellant a constitutionally meaningful predeprivation 
remedy. However, there is considerable doubt whether any general 
remedial statute, such as a declaratory judgment actf can ever be 
considered to be an available "clear and certain remedy11 such that 
a taxpayer's failure to have invoked those provisions can be deemed 
to evidence his "voluntary0 payment of unconstitutional taxes. As 
I understand the mandate of the controlling decisions of the 
Supreme court of the United States, the determination of the 
availability of a taxpayer's "clear and certain'1 predeprivation 
remedy should be confined to a consideration of the specific tax 
structure enacted by the state, and not be based upon the existence 
of general remedies which, with the benefit of hindsight, can be 
urged to have otherwise been available to the taxpayer* See Harper 
v. Va» Dept, of Taxation, supra, and McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic 
Beverages and Tobacco, supra, neither of which discuss the 
availability of general, rather than specific, taxpayer relief. 
Confining our inquiry to the specific statutes, such as 0CGA § § 
48-2-59 and 50-13-12, which do relate to the resolution of tax 
disputes, it is clear to me that Georgia has established "various 
sanctions and summary remedies designed so that [taxpayers] tender 
tax payments before their objections are entertained and resolved. 
As a result, [Georgia] does not purport to provide taxpayers like 
[appellant] with a meaningful opportunity to withhold payment and 
to obtain a predeprivation determination of the tax assessment's 
7 
validity*.. •'* (Emphasis in original.) McKesson v. Div» of 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, supra at 38 (III) (B). 
In any event, I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion 
that the Georgia Declaratory Judgment Act can be considered to be 
such a "clear and certain remedy11 that appellant's failure to have 
invoiced its provisions evidences his * voluntary11 payment of the 
unconstitutional taxes. As is true in the case of the 
administrative remedy, there is nothing in our Declaratory Judgment 
Act which authorizes the taxpayer to withhold his taxes pending 
resolution of his claim or which compels the department to forego 
employment of the various sanctions and summary remedies that it is 
otherwise authorized to pursue under the tax code. The trial court 
is authorized to grant the taxpayer injunctive relief, but the 
exercise of that authority is discretionary and a taxpayer cannot, 
thereforef be assured that the department's collection procedures 
will be stayed. Since the declaratory judgment remedy advanced by 
the majority does not clearly protect the taxpayer against the 
department's employment of its various sanctions and summary 
remedies which are otherwise designed to encourage timely payment 
of taxes prior to resolution of the disputef I cannot agree with 
the majority's conclusion that that remedy satisfies the minimum 
requirements of federal due process. 
For all the reasons stated, I believe that appellant's payment 
of the unconstitutional taxes was not made "voluntarily,w but was 
made under "duress.11 I believe, therefore, that the majority 
opinion erroneously ,fconfine[s] [appellant] to a lesser remedy" 
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than that which federal due process demands. Harper v. Va. Depfc. 
of Taxation, supra at CHI)- Accordingly, I must respectfully 
dissent to the majority's failure to afford appellant the 
"meaningful backward-looking relief11 of the refund to which he is 
constitutionally entitled. Harper v> va. Dept, of Taxation, supra 
at (III). 
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears-Collins joins in 
this dissent. 
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S93A1217, S93A1218. JAMES B. BEAM DISTILLING CO, V. STATE OF 
GEORGIA et al. (two cases) 
BENHAM, Justice4 
Appellant James B* Beam Distilling company (Beam) brought this 
action seeking a refund for taxes paid pursuant to OCGA § 3-4-601 
in 1982-1984. See OCGA § 48-2-35* The trial court's decision that 
OCGA § 3-4-60 violated the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution was affirmed by this court, as was the trial court's 
determination that the ruling was to be applied prospectively only* 
James B. Beam &c, v. State of Georgia. 259 Ga. 363 (382 SE2d 95) 
(1989) {"Beam I"). After granting Beam's application for 
certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that its 
*The statute was amended in 1985 after the United States 
Supreme Court found a similar statute from Hawaii to be an 
unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause (Bacchus imports 
V- Dias, 468 U.S* 263 (104 SC 3049, 82 LE2d 200) (1984)), and the 
amended statute has withstood constitutional challenge. See 
Heublein, Inc. v. State of Georgia, 256 Ga, 578 (351 SE2d 190) 
(1987)• 
decision in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (104 SC 
3049, 82 LE2d 200) (1984), was applicable retroactively to Beam's 
claims that arose on facts antedating the Bacchus decision, and 
remanded the case for determination of remedial issues. James B. 
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S* (111 SC 2439, 115 LE2d 
481) (1991). We, in turn, remanded the case to the trial court 
which granted summary judgment to appellee after concluding, based 
on three independent grounds, that appellant was not entitled to a 
refund of the 1982-84 taxes. The appeal in S93A1217 is from the 
trial court's denial of summary judgment TO Beam and the grant of 
summary judgment to the state on Beam's original complaint. The 
appeal in S93A1218 is from the trial court's denial of summary 
judgment to Beam on the allegations raised in the first and second 
amendments to its complaint, and the grant of summary judgment to 
the State on the amendments* 
1. After our remand to the trial courtf appellant amended its 
complaint to seek a judicial determination that OCGA § 48-2-3 5 (the 
refund statute) was applicable to appellant and that the 1992 
amendment to OCGA § 3-2-14 (a) was unconstitutional as applied to 
Beam; and to assert a claim under 42 USC § 1983 and a concommitant 
claim for attorney fees under 42 use § 1988. The State amended its 
answer to assert several additional defenses, including the 
assertion that appellant did not have standing to seek a refund 
under OCGA § 48-2-35.* We entertain the State's standing argument 
*The U.S. Supreme Court invited the State to invoke, on 
remand, independent procedural bases for its refusal to provide a 
refund. See Beam Distilling Co, v. Georgia.supra, ill SC 2439, 
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because the consideration of a remedy "may well be .. , obviated by 
issues of state lav." Bacchus Imports. Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 
277 (104 SC 3049f 82 LE2d 200} (1984) .3 
2. "A particular remedy is not available to a party who has 
no entitlement to the right sought to be secured*" Raqsdale v. New 
England Land &c. Corp,, 250 Ga- 233 (1) (297 SE2d 31) (1982). In 
cases involving the Georgia sales and use tax (OCGA § 48-8-30 et 
seq,)# the appellate courts of this State have repeatedly held that 
the payer of taxes to the state, while technically a "taxpayer" 
under § 48-2-35r does not have standing to file a claim for refund 
of taxes illegally collected or erroneously paid if the party 
remitting the taxes passed the tax on to its customers„ Eimco BSP 
Services Co. v. Chilivis. 241 Ga* 263 (244 SE2d 829) (1978); 
Atlanta Americana Motor Hotel Corp, v, TJndercofler. 222 Ga. 295 (1) 
(149 SE2d 691) (1966); Blackmon v. Ga, Ind, Oilmen's Assn., 129 Ga, 
App. 171 (3) (198 SE2d 896) (1973); Blackmon v. Premium Oil 
Stations, Inc, . 129 Ga- App, 169 (2) (198 SE2d 900) (1973). If the 
remitting party did not bear the burden of the tax, it is not 
entitled to bring a suit to recover a refund of any overpayment. 
In the case at bar, the applicable version of OCGA § 3*4-60 
(1) levied and imposed an excise tax on alcohol and distilled 
2448. 
3For purposes of this appeal, we assume that OCGA § 48-2-35 
may be an appropriate means by which one may seek a refund of taxes 
paid pursuant to a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional. 
See State of Georgia v. Private Truck Council &c» . 258 Ga, 531 (371 
SE2d 378) (1988), But see Reich v. Collins, 262 Ga. 625 (422 SE2d 
826) (1992)-
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spirits imported into Georgia* By requiring the stamps denoting 
payment of the tax to be affixed by the manufacturer or the 
wholesaler to each bottle or container of distilled spirits before 
shipment to any retailer (OCGA § 3-4-61 (2) (1982))f the General 
Assembly expressed its intent that the excise tax be paid before 
the product was made available for purchase by the consuming 
public.4 Where a wholesaler is a link in the chain of delivery of 
the product to the retailer, it is essential that the excise tax be 
paid by the time the product leaves the wholesaler.5 Where, as 
here, the manufacturer remits tax payment to the revenue 
commissioner and subsequently, in an itemized billing statement, 
requires the wholesaler to remit payment for "state stamps" or 
••state tax,1' it is the wholesaler which is the taxpayer for 
purposes of OCGA § 48-2-35.6 Due to its lack of standing, 
appellant is procedurally barred from pursuing an action for refund 
under OCGA § 48-2-35. 
3. Even assuming that appellant was not procedurally barred 
from seeking a refund under § 48-2-35, federal due process, as 
4Stamps denoting the payment of the excise tax were required 
to be affixed to each bottle or container of distilled spirits. 
OCGA 5 3-4-61 (1982). Effective February 1, 1993, the revenue 
commissioner is required to adopt rules and regulations eliminating 
the use of a stamp in the payment of the excise tax on distilled 
spirits and alcohol. See OCGA § 3-4-61 (1992), 
5ln 1992, the legislature amended OCGA § 3-4-61 to state 
explicitly that the excise tax was to be paid by the wholesale 
dealer- OCGA § 3-4-61 (a) (1992)• 
^Credits or refunds issued in the discretion of the revenue 
commissioner tinder OCGA § 3-2-13 to a manufacturer are statutorily 
required to be refunded or credited to the wholesaler, the party 
who actually paid the tax. 
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interpreted by the Supreme Court in ftcKesson Corp. v, Fla. 
iyicoholic Beverages and Tobacco Piv*, 496 U.S. 18 (110 SC 2323, 110 
LE2d 148) (1990), and elaborated upon in Harper v» Virginia Dept. 
of Taxation, 509 U.S. (113 SC 2510, 509 LE2d ) (1993), does 
not require that the State of Georgia refund to appellant the 
discriminatory portion of the excise taxes appellant remitted in 
1982-1984 pursuant to OCGA § 3-2-60*7 
A governmental requirement that one pay a tax deprives the 
payor of property, and such a deprivation mandates compliance with 
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States. 
Due process requires a government to have procedural means by which 
the taxpayer may safeguard against unlawful exactions* McKesson, 
110 SC 2238, supra, at 2250, "The fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in 
a meaningful manner," [Cits]." Mathews v. Eldridere, 424 U.S- 319, 
333 (96 SC 893f 47 LE2d 18) (1976). While due process generally 
requires that the hearing be held prior to the deprivation, the 
Court, recognizing that the exaction of taxes is the lifeblood of 
a governmental entity, has permitted governments to exact taxes and 
require the taxpayer to voice objections to the tax thereafter. 
Should the governmental entity so procedurally limit itself, it 
7Appellant contends that our statement in Beam I. 259 Ga. 363, 
at 365f that the State would have to refund monies should the 
Bacchus decision be applied retroactively is a conclusive admission 
that refunds are due now that the U.S. Supreme Court has decided 
the retroactivity issue adversely to the State• Beam, 501 U.S. 
In so relying on the statement, appellant has taken it out of its 
context, a discussion of the equities of retroactivity under the 
analysis set forth in Chevron oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (92 SC 349, 
30 LE2d 296) (1971). 
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must provide "meaningful, backward-looking relief to rectify any 
unconstitutional deprivation.11 McKesson. supra, at 2247. However, 
should the government provide a procedure through which the 
taxpayer may challenge the validity of the taking prior to the 
deprivation the Due Process Clause is satisfied. IdL, at 2251f 
n*21. Thus, before attempting to fashion a post-deprivation, 
meaningful, backward-looking remedy,8 we must determine the state 
law question of whether Georgia law "provides an adequate form of 
predeprivation process.••." Harper v. Va. Dept, of Taxation. 113 
SC 2510, supra, at 2520. 
4* In its discussions on the topic, the U.S. supreme Court 
illustrates "predeprivation process" as that which authorizes 
taxpayers to bring suit to enjoin imposition of a tax prior to its 
payment, or that which permits taxpayers to withhold contested tax 
assessments and challenge their validity in a predeprivation 
hearing. McKesson, supra, at 2250 and 2251r n.21. In Georgia, a 
taxpayer who fails to pay taxes due is subject to being named a 
defendant in an action brought by the revenue commissioner to 
collect the amount due* OCGA S 48-2-54. In such an action, the 
taxpayer would have the opportunity to challenge the validity of 
the imposition of the contested taxation prior to paying the tax. 
That the Commissioner is statutorily authorized to seek penalties 
*The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently left it to the States 
to craft an appropriate post-deprivation remedy. See e.g..Harper 
v, Va. Dept. of Taxation, supra? James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. 
Ga,, supra; McKesson v. Fla» Alcoholic Beverages &c, supra; Davis 
v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (109 SC 1500, 103 LE2d 891) (1989); and 
Bacchus Imports v. Dias, supra. 
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is not a financial sanction tantamount to an attempt to secure 
payment of taxes under duress (see jfcKesson. supra, at 2251, n.2i, 
and Harper, supra, at 2519, n. 10) since the penalties are subject 
to waiver by the revenue commissioner upon a determination that the 
taxpayer's default was the result of reasonable cause and was not 
due to gross or willful neglect or disregard of the law or 
regulations. OCGA § 3-2-12. 
5. In addition, Georgia statutes make declaratory judgment 
relief available prior to payment of disputed taxes "to settle and 
afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to 
rights, status, and other legal relations..," (OCGA § 9-4-1), and 
such relief is available even if the party has other adequate legal 
or equitable remedies. OCGA § 9-4-2 (c) . 
The Declaratory Judgment Act is an alternative or 
additional remedy to facilitate the administration of 
justice more readily . „. [and is] intended to give 
additional protection to a person who may become involved 
in an actual justiciable controversy,.. • rghippen v, 
Folsom, 200 Ga, SB, 6B (35 SE2d 915) (1945)]. 
Another intended purpose of declaratory judgment is "to afford a 
speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating legal disputes." 
Clein v. Kaplan. 201 Ga* 396, 404 (40 SE2d 133) (1946). In 
furtherance of this goal, the Declaratory Judgment Act empowers the 
superior court in which a petition for declaratory judgment is 
filed to grant injunctive or other interlocutory extraordinary 
relief in connection with the petition• OCGA § 9-4-3 (b); see also 
OCGA § 9-11-65 (b) • Thus, a petition may be filed seeking a 
judgment declaring a statute or ordinance unconstitutional and 
praying for an injunction against the enforcement of the questioned 
7 
lav. See e,g*, Gravely v. Bacon. 263 Ga. 203 (429 SE2d 663) 
(1993); State of Georgia v. Private Truck Council &c, 258 Ga. 531 
(371 SE2d 378) (1988); City of Atlanta v. Spence. 242 Ga, 194 (249 
SE2d 554) (1978); State of Georgia v. Golia. 235 Ga, 791 (222 SE2d 
27) (1976)•* Should the party seeking relief be threatened with 
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage, the party may 
apply immediately for a temporary restraining order• OCGA § 9-11-
65 (b) * When tax statutes have been the subject of a declaratory 
judgment action, the trial court has exercised its discretion to 
establish escrow funds for payment of the disputed taxes should the 
taxpayer choose to tender payment- See Collins v. Waldron, 259 Ga. 
582 (385 SE2d 74) (1989) ; State of Georgia v. Private Truck 
Council. supra, at Div* 4. In sum, a taxpayer who wishes to 
challenge the validity of a statute that imposes a duty upon him to 
pay a tax may do so prior to paying the disputed tax, and has 
recourse to judicial remedies to enjoin collection of the contested 
tax pending final determination of his judicial challenge to the 
statute. 
6. Finally, within the Georgia Alcoholic Beverage Code (OCGA 
§1 3-1-1 et seq.) there is in place the means by which appellant, 
as a licensed wholesale dealer (see OCGA § 3-1-2 (23)), could 
receive administrative review, complete with notice and a hearing, 
9ln point of fact, in 1985, several of appellant's attorneys, 
then representing an importer of alcoholic beverages, filed an 
action against Georgia's taxing authorities in which they sought a 
declaratory judgment that a taxing statute was unconstitutional and 
an injunction against its enforcement. See Hublein, inc. v. State 
of Georgia. 256 Ga. 578 (351 SE2d 190) (1987). 
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of the commissi oner's determination that appellant had not remitted 
the "proper amount of taxes.m OCGA § 3-2-11 (2). Under this 
scheme, appellant could remit the non-discriminatory portion of its 
tax assessment and attack the taxing statute in the administrative 
hearing held to determine the amount due. The notice and hearing 
provisions of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (OCGA § 50-
13) are incorporated into the procedure for assessment of taxes due 
in OCGA § 3-2-11 (2), Furthermore, within the APA there is a 
section exclusively devoted to the hearing procedure required of 
the Department of Revenue within 30 days of receipt of a demand 
therefor by "any taxpayer aggrieved by any act of the department in 
a matter involving his liability for taxes..•„" OCGA § 50-13-12. 
OCGA §50-13-12 (d) recognizes that judicial remedies may also be 
available to the aggrieved taxpayer, and requires the taxpayer to 
elect between pursuing judicial remedies or the remedy available 
for a "contested case" within the APA. 
7. The above survey of certain provisions of Georgia law in 
place and available to appellant prior to its payment of taxes in 
1982 - 1985 establishes that appellant had available to it several 
means by which it could attack the validity of former OCGA § 3-4-60 
prior to remitting taxes due thereunder. Instead, appellant chose 
to pay the taxes charged without questioning the legal basis 
therefor. Having failed to avail itself of any one of the variety 
of predeprivation remedies available to itf appellant cannot now 
complain. See United gtates v. Tax Commission of Mississippi. 412 
U.S* 363, 368, n. 11 (93 SC 2183, 37 LE2d 1} (1973); McKesson v. 
9 
Fla« Div. of Alcoholic &c.. supra, at 2251, n. 21. 
We conclude that appellant was procedurally barred from 
pursuing a refund action for the taxes remitted in 1982 - 1985 
pursuant to former OCGA § 3-4-60 and that, even if appellant were 
entitled to pursue a refund action, its failure to avail itself of 
the predeprivation remedies available to it prior to payment of the 
disputed taxes results in denial of recovery of taxes so paid. 
8, in light of our decision on the issues raised in A93A1217, 
we need not address the enumeration of errors asserted in A93A1218, 
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Sears-
Collins and Carley, JJ., who concur in Divisions 1 and 2 and the 
judgment. 
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S93A1217, S93A1218, JAMES B. BEAK DISTILLING CO. v. THE STATE OF 
GEORGIA et al. (two cases) 
CARLEY, Justice, concurring. 
Divisions l and 2 of the majority opinion hold that appellant 
has no standing to seek a refund of taxes that it previously paid 
the State pursuant to former OCGA § 3-4-60. I concur fully in 
those divisions and in the judgment of affirmance based upon the 
procedural bar of appellant's lack of standing. Since appellant 
has no standing to seek a refund, I would not reach the merits of 
appellant's entitlement to recover a refund which the majority 
addresses in Divisions 3# 4f 5, 6 and 7 of its opinion* I would 
note, however, thatr for the reasons set forth in my dissent in 
Reich v, Collins. Ga. (Case Number S93A0621, decided December 
, 1993), I believe that the majority erroneously holds in those 
divisions that appellant would be barred from recovering a refund 
for its failure to have pursued the predeprivation remedies that 
are available to a Georgia taxpayer. 
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears-collins joins in 
this opinion. 
